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In two new studies, the researchers challenge several long-held assumptions in the Raoul Wallenberg investigation, including details about Wallenberg’s appointment to the humanitarian mission in Budapest, his contacts and activities in Hungary, and the factors that influenced the official Swedish handling of Wallenberg’s disappearance after 1945.
The compiled findings suggest that the extreme passivity of the Swedish government in the Raoul Wallenberg case may have been the result of [several accumulating] factors not yet fully recognised or understood. Contrary to previous claims, Sweden’s lack of decisive action does not appear to have been simply the result of administrative failure, chaotic post-war conditions, individual incompetence, Wallenberg’s status as an ‚outsider‘, or Sweden’s overwhelming fear of the Soviet Union. In many ways, it appears to have been a conscious decision by Swedish decision-makers, influenced by a variety of motives.
In particular, the new findings lead to a possible reassessment of the actions of the much-criticised Swedish envoy to Moscow Staffan Söderblom, the late ambassador Per Anger, Wallenberg’s colleague in Budapest in 1944, and others, including Sverker Åström, one of Sweden’s top diplomats in the post-war period, who is believed to have acted as a Soviet agent during his long career.
For more information and the latest news about the project, see the latest issue of the RWI-70 newsletter.