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New research clearly indicates that the extreme passivity of the Swedish government in the Raoul Wallenberg case was in many ways a deliberate decision, based on a variety of motives.
In addition to the question of when exactly and under what circumstances Raoul Wallenberg died in the Soviet Union, another central question remains unanswered: Why was the Swedish Foreign Ministry so quick to accept unconfirmed rumours and claims that he was dead and could not be rescued immediately after Wallenberg’s disappearance in January 1945?
In two analyses published at the beginning of 2021 – The Secret Swedish-Hungarian Intelligence Sharing Agreement of 1943-44: Possible implications for the Raoul Wallenberg Case and „Why did Raoul Wallenberg ask to go to Moscow in January 1945?“ – Wallenberg experts Susanne Berger and Vadim Birstein have identified a number of additional factors that may have influenced the official handling of the Wallenberg case, both immediately after Wallenberg’s disappearance in Hungary in 1945 and in later years.
There is an urgent need to clarify to what extent these hitherto unknown or insufficiently considered factors influenced official Swedish behaviour in the Wallenberg case in the period 1945-1947 and also in later years, including the official investigation of the Swedish-Russian working group in the 1990s.
To further deepen this discussion, we are today launching a series of three articles:
Bengt Jangfeldt:
Raoul Wallenberg and the question of the whereabouts of Jewish valuables
Peter Axelsson:
Raoul Wallenberg: Can a Swedish billion-krona loan to the Soviet Union explain Staffan Söderblom’s disastrous meeting with Stalin?
Susanne Berger and Vadim Birstein:
Staffan Söderblom’s severe guilt complex
The new findings from these studies strongly suggest that – contrary to earlier claims – Sweden’s failure in the Wallenberg case was not only due to serious failures in the Swedish administrative apparatus, the chaotic post-war conditions, individual incompetence, Wallenberg’s status as an „outsider“ or Sweden’s overwhelming fear of the Soviet Union. Instead, the extreme passivity of the Swedish government in the Raoul Wallenberg case appears to have been a conscious decision by a specific group of Swedish officials to prioritise Sweden’s political and economic interests (as they defined them) over the need to clarify the fate of their fellow diplomat.
The new research findings also provide at least a partial reassessment of the behaviour of key players in the Wallenberg case, including that of the much-criticised and controversial Swedish ambassador to Moscow (1945-1946), Staffan Söderblom.
The various investigations thus reveal fascinating and important new approaches to unanswered questions and for further international research into the Raoul Wallenberg case.
In his biography of Raoul Wallenberg from 2012, Bengt Jangfeldt posed the question of Jewish valuables, such as gold jewellery and precious stones, which the young Swedish diplomat allegedly tried to smuggle out of Budapest. Wallenberg wanted to prevent these items from being looted by the Nazis or the Soviets. The attempt failed, but the rumour that Wallenberg was involved in an action that was incompatible with his status as a diplomat may, in Jangfeldt’s opinion, have had a negative effect on the Swedish government’s willingness to initiate an active search for Wallenberg, at least initially. Bengt Jangfeldt presented the following two-part analysis for the first time in a video presentation in Stockholm in September 2017. (Raoul Wallenberg International Roundtable)
Bengt Jangfeldt – born 1948, professor emeritus of Slavic languages and literature at Stockholm University. Author of several biographies, including The Hero of Budapest: The Triumph and Tragedy of Raoul Wallenberg (London: I.B. Tauris 2014)