Autor/Autorin
The picture has changed. Whereas in the 1980s Central American states were regarded as central trouble spots in international relations due to their social conflicts, instrumentalised in proxy wars during the ‚Cold War‘, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala have generally been seen as examples of successful international conflict resolution since the 1990s. With regard to Guatemala, however, the success is only superficial. The central social differences and social tensions that led to the formation of the left-wing guerrillas at the beginning of the 1960s, and which gave rise to their support, particularly among the indigenous population, have not diminished or disappeared.
Guatemala, one of the six relatively small Central American states, borders Mexico to the north, Belize and Honduras to the west and El Salvador to the south. If you enter the country, which at just under 108,000 km² is roughly the size of the former German Democratic Republic, by land from Mexico, you are immediately surrounded by much greater poverty, a clear prosperity gap is obvious, although travellers have already had to witness omnipresent poverty when crossing the Mexican states of Oaxaca and Chiapas. The country’s population is estimated at around 16 million, with around three million people concentrated in the capital Guatemala City, which continues to grow rapidly due to the ongoing rural exodus. Around a third of the population are descendants of European immigrants. Almost two thirds belong to the heterogeneous Mayan population with 20 different indigenous languages, which are often not understood between the individual groups.
In 2005, nine years after the end of the thirty-six-year civil war, it was estimated that the illiteracy rate was still at least 40 per cent. In rural regions in particular, 30 to 40 per cent of children were not given the chance to complete a primary school education, meaning that no significant reduction in the rate could be expected for the next generation. In the meantime, however, remarkable progress has been made. As early as 2012, the World Bank was able to report a literacy rate of 93.7 per cent for the 15 to 24 age group. Nevertheless, in 2016, 20 years after the end of the war, the picture was ambivalent. Although Guatemala now has the strongest economy in Central America and can boast the strongest economic growth in Latin America [1] , not everyone is benefiting from this development. Social and economic inequality is greater than in almost any other Latin American country; although extreme poverty, malnutrition and infant mortality have been reduced slightly, the figures are alarming even by Latin American standards, particularly in rural regions with an indigenous population.[ 2] According to official figures, the proportion of people living in poverty rose from 51 to 59.3 per cent between 2006 and 2014; once again, the indigenous population, which was subjected to systematic genocide during the 36-year-long internal conflict – particularly under General Efraín Ríos Montt – is most affected by poverty.
Guatemala’s independence in 1823 was followed by a series of dictatorial regimes, among which the 22-year rule (1898-1920) of Manuel Estrada Carbera and the dictatorship (1931-1944) of General Jorge Ubico stand out in negative terms with regard to the human rights situation in the country. Economic and industrial modernisation with growing social inequality – especially at the expense of the Mayan population – characterised the last years of Carbera’s rule, the „feared and hated“ tyrant Ubico [ 3 ] , who forced the indigenous population to work in road construction. Ubico granted the USA far-reaching concessions on a military and economic level, including to the United Fruit Company; the distribution of fertile land was thus continued at the expense of the indigenous population, and the tense social situation became increasingly tense. A largely non-violent revolution finally led to his overthrow; Ubico was forced to leave the country in 1944 and died two years later in the USA. [4] Following democratic elections, the country experienced a – brief – phase of freedom (1945-1951) during the presidency of the left-wing reformist President Juan José Arévalo (1904 – 1990); Guatemala became a refuge for displaced persons from all over Latin America. Arévalo, who held a doctorate in philosophy and was the first time in the country’s history that organised labour played a significant role, initiated far-reaching social reforms, his administration established a system of social security, education and health programmes, guaranteed freedom of speech and the press and refused to recognise Franco’s governments in Spain, Rafael Trujillo’s in the Dominican Republic or Anastasio Somoza’s in Nicaragua.[ 5] Arévalo is the author of the book The Shark and the Sardines (1961), in which he criticised the dominance of the USA in Latin America [ 6 ] .
Far-reaching agrarian reform was at the centre of the term of office (1951-1954) of his elected successor Jacobo Arbenz (1913-1973), who was involved in the overthrow of Ubico alongside left-wing officers and then held the office of Minister of Defence in Arévalo’s government. As president, he had the army behind him and was supported by left-wing parties – including the Communist Party.
However, his plans for comprehensive agrarian reform brought him into conflict with large landowners, above all with the United Fruit Company, now the largest landowner in Guatemala: this circumstance and the fear of losing investments and loans, but above all CIA reports about support for the Guatemalan government from the Eastern Bloc, which later proved to be unsubstantiated, prompted the US government to support counter-revolutionary forces operating from Honduras and El Salvador.[ 7] After the army had refused to fight for the Arbenz government, it was forced to resign on 27 June 1954. Castillo Armas, leader of the counter-revolutionary army, took over the presidency. While Armas cancelled most of the reforms, Arbenz was forced into exile. After several stops, he was found dead in his bathtub in exile in Mexico in 1971 [8] .
The Armas coup was the prelude to a phase of growing tensions, a 34-year civil war that escalated into systematic genocide and a period of unrest that continues to this day – almost 20 years after the end of the armed conflict: fundamental economic, social and societal problems that triggered the conflict at the time have not yet been resolved in a sustainable manner.
The armed conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala were triggered by upheavals in agricultural structures to the detriment of the smallholder population, which destroyed the structure of local and regional markets, among other things. The possibility of exchanging regional farm produce and other products was eliminated, without alternatives emerging in other economic sectors. The majority of Guatemalans, especially the Maya, are farmers and depend on a piece of fertile land to survive. This exacerbation of the social and cultural inequality that already existed in all three countries, as well as increasing state repression – in Guatemala after the coup against the Arbenz government – which did not allow any opportunities for political participation or opposition and which increasingly used state violence to regulate social tensions, favoured the emergence of left-wing alliances positioned against the regimes in all three countries and created great recruitment potential in rural areas. In Guatemala, this potential also extended to the indigenous majority of the population, who were and in some cases still are particularly subject to racism, discrimination and social exclusion [9] .
The success of the Cuban Revolution (1959) initially gave the insurgent groups of Central America a tailwind, although they, like their state and paramilitary opponents, were soon to be instrumentalised as pawns of the forces of the Cold War. Although the regional starting positions of social inequality, repression and discrimination remain virulent, the civil war parties are always also pawns in the East-West conflict.
In 1963, the military took power. No longer a president who had come to power through democratic legitimisation with the support of the army, the army itself now assumed sole power in the country, which it believed it had to lead in the confrontation with the insurgents. [10] An initial phase of terror and insecurity escalated in 1966, when 28 leaders of the communist party were abducted and killed by the army. In 1979, with support from Cuba and Nicaragua, the insurgents succeeded in gaining ground in the north-west of the country, where they found broad support among the indigenous population.
As a victory for the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) became increasingly likely, the military regime switched to a scorched earth policy. Terror, intimidation, systematic repression and persecution of all opposition and human rights groups intensified massively from 1979 onwards. Any group that did not conform to the government and merely dared to mention the term ’social justice‘ was considered subversive. [11] The practice of forcibly ‚disappearing‘ unpopular people or (alleged) supporters of the guerrillas, which claimed the lives of between 30,000 and 40,000 people, accompanied the entire period of the civil war. The military actions from 1979 onwards were generally aimed at destroying the actual or potential base of the insurgents among the civilian population. In this context, villages were burned down, harvests destroyed and numerous massacres of the civilian population carried out – an escalation that ultimately led to genocide, a racially motivated systematic extermination of the indigenous population. Mayan villages were systematically razed to the ground as potential retreats for the insurgents and massacres of extreme cruelty were committed. According to the Truth Commission’s report, the inhabitants of numerous districts were murdered en masse, women were raped beforehand, pregnant women had their stomachs cut open, small children were crushed against trees, while [12]
In January 1980, peasants occupied the Spanish embassy building in Guatemala City without using any violence to draw the world’s attention to their desperate situation; they demanded an end to the massacres in the Mayan settlement areas. Their reaction shows how little the Guatemalan military dictatorship was impressed by possible international reactions. Although the Spanish ambassador had refused to give his consent to police action, units stormed the building, set it on fire, members of the embassy were killed and the Spanish envoy himself narrowly escaped with his life [13] .
The ’strategy‘ of depriving the insurgents of popular support by destroying the population reached its peak between 1981 and 1983 under the responsibility of President Efraim Rios Montt; over 100,000 people fell victim to the genocidal actions of the military and paramilitary units in these two years alone. [14] After the US administration under President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions against Guatemala due to the ongoing human rights violations, Montt could once again count on aid from the USA as part of the Reagan Doctrine. Between 1980 and 1986, according to the NY Times, US ‚economic aid‘ to the Central American country rose from 11 million to 104 million dollars, with a large part of the money being used for military operations against the indigenous population as part of the ‚communist fight against terrorism‘. [15] Although the State Department was aware of the massacres, Ronald Reagan still described Efrain Rios Montt as a „man of great integrity“ in 1982; no help was to be expected for the Mayan Guatemalans from the ‚pro-Western‘ Mexican side either [16] .
The consequence of the escalation was a wave of refugees that began in the early 1980s Hundreds of thousands fled the scorched earth operations by the army and paramilitaries from the rural areas; it is estimated that 600,000 to 1.5 million people were on the run within Guatemala. [17] Many of them were probably absorbed into the nameless army of the poor in the slums of Guatemala City, without identity and without rights. Many of them were captured and settled in so-called ‚model villages‘ under military guard; poorly equipped, they were often misused as human shields against the rebels. Around 200,000 people fled across the borders, around 150,000 to Mexico. Around 86 per cent of those who fled were indigenous farmers. [18] Nevertheless, it became clear that the insurgents could not be defeated in the long term through the use of force.
Reconciliation also included a request to the governments of the region not to use the respective territories to destabilise the other Central American states. [21] Although respect for human rights was not included in the agreement, the treaty was nevertheless a step towards de-escalation and pacification of the region.
1. the truth commission
The ceasefire agreement [22] ratified on 4 December 1996 between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) ended the armed conflict in the Central American country, which had lasted for over three decades. The agreements concluded under the mediation of the United Nations were preceded by ten years of negotiations, during which a series of individual agreements were successively concluded with the participation of four governments. The peace treaty had already been followed by a framework agreement on respect for human rights (29 March 1994), an agreement on the resettlement and reintegration of around 600,000 displaced persons and refugees (17 June 1994) and an agreement on the rights of the indigenous majority (31 March 1995) in cooperation with the UN. This was followed by an agreement to regulate the socio-economic situation and the problem of land distribution (6 March 1996), another to strengthen civilian power and limit the influence of the army in a constitutional and democratic social order to be established (9 September 1996) and finally an agreement on constitutional amendments and a reform of the electoral system (7 December 1996). 23]
All preliminary agreements came into force with the final agreement of 29 December 1996 for a firm and lasting peace (Acuerdo de paz firme y duradera).
The above-mentioned partial agreements were supplemented by the Oslo Agreement of 23 June 1994, in which the establishment of a truth commission was agreed. The impetus for the establishment of a commission to establish historical truth (La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH)) [24] came primarily from civil society involvement; both warring parties were responsible for human rights violations and were not interested in clarifying them.[ 25] It was possible to draw on the experience of similar commissions in Argentina, Chile and El Salvador, whereby the constellation, social, social and political background, the subject matter to be dealt with and the form of debate as well as the objectives to be achieved made each of the commissions a unique, individual instrument [26] .
However, all truth commissions have some characteristics in common; they are usually established supranationally in transitional phases from civil war or dictatorship to a democratic social order with a time-limited mandate. They are orientated towards the past and, through their evaluation of testimonies, eyewitness and victim interviews regarding previous war crimes and/or human rights violations, create a foundation for future work on the past, prosecution and jurisdiction, social discourse and historical narrative. The work of a commission is often linked to a mission of reconciliation, which is difficult to define and achieve. In transition processes, the aim is to create a basis for social reconciliation, to mark a turning point and to facilitate the transition to the rule of law by coming to terms with past crimes. As a rule, truth commissions assume some of the powers of prosecuting authorities and courts, whereby the focus is usually on the structural exposure of crimes committed by state institutions, the military or civil war parties and the attribution of institutional responsibility. In most cases, it is then up to the judiciary of the respective country to determine individual guilt or innocence. It is the task of the commissions to identify the causes and lines of development of a conflict, to uncover and describe its dynamics and any external influences, and to explain the methods and systems of human rights violations in order to provide society, the judiciary and politicians with a set of tools for coping with and coming to terms with their transition process to a new, peaceful order that respects human rights in a concluding report.
It was the task of the CEH, whose findings are now also available in English translation [27] , to clarify with the greatest possible objectivity, impartiality and impartiality, not to pass judgement. The latter should also be reserved for the courts. Human rights violations and acts of violence that had been committed in connection with the violent conflict that lasted over three decades had to be clarified. How could this conflict escalate into such extreme forms of violence as the acts of genocide committed in the early 1980s? Why was state violence directed with such intensity against civilians, especially Maya, women and children? After all, according to the commission’s findings, state forces including the army, police and paramilitary units were responsible for 93 per cent of human rights violations, while three per cent were committed by the URNG rebels. [28] What did the attempt to wipe out the Xmukane tribe have to do with the defence against a supposed communist threat? How could this escalation of violence come about, an escalation in which almost all basic principles of human and Christian ethics and Mayan spiritual values were disregarded?
The Truth Commission consisted of three members. Christian Tomuschat, Chair of Public Law and International Law at the University of Bonn from 1972 to 1995, took on the role of coordinator of the commission on behalf of the United Nations. 29] A further member of the commission was proposed by the country’s universities – the decision was made in favour of the lawyer Edgar Alfredo Balsells Tojo, who had distinguished himself through his incorruptibility during the dictatorships. 30] An upstanding citizen was to complete the commission. Otilia Lux de Cotí, an indigenous woman, was chosen to represent the group that had suffered the most from the human rights violations. [31] For the first time, a commission consisting of national and international representatives was set up.
The human rights violations on which the commission focussed included
– extrajudicial executions, torture and enforced disappearances of people considered by the military to be members or supporters of the insurgents,
– attacks on the civilian population in regions where the insurgents were active, including attacks against internally displaced persons,
– forced recruitment,
– impunity in connection with human rights violations as well as the
– General disrespect for social, economic and cultural rights [32] .
Initially, the CEH’s intention was to give everyone a voice. Although partly legitimised by international law, the Commission’s contact points throughout the country were the first places where those affected were able to share their experiences and suffering with a quasi-state institution, in a protected space, on the basis of guaranteed confidentiality. For many, this was a first step towards finding trust in a post-war order. The CEH had launched a nationwide media campaign calling for witness statements. As previously in Argentina and El Salvador, thousands of reports and tips were received from institutions and individuals. The names of the witnesses were kept secret. The main basis for the commission’s report, which was presented on 25 February 1999, was a source base of more than 8,000 witness statements [33] .
Given the short time of the mandate and the small number of staff, a sketch of the systematics of the policy of violence and institutional responsibility could only be sketchy.
This did not change the final report’s conclusion that the state apparatus had pursued a systematic policy of abduction, murder and torture against all forms of political opposition for decades [34] .
When this result was read out at the public presentation of the report and the massacres of the indigenous population were also categorised as genocide by the commission in public, the audience is said to have reacted with a „never-ending ovation“ [35] .
The main result of the truth commission is that the frequently presented defence claim that it was a necessary fight against communist guerrilla groups could no longer be upheld. [36] The work of the commission has proven and documented that the army, including the police and paramilitary forces, had waged a systematic war of extermination and committed genocide against the indigenous population during the civil war, especially under President Montt’s government.[ 37] Guatemalan society and politics can no longer go back on this result; through the work of the commission, war crimes and genocide have become part of Guatemala’s history. 38] The results of the CEH can be a long-term point of reference and a not insignificant building block in the context of a nation-building process that has already begun, but is far from complete. 39]
2 CICIG – Commission against Impunity since 2006
„The Guatemalan authorities must learn a valuable lesson and leave no stone unturned to ensure all those suspected of criminal responsibility for the thousands of brutal killings and disappearances that took place during the country’s darkest years face the courts. These delays have caused enough suffering. Victims and their relatives have the right to know what happened, see justice done and receive reparations.“ [40]
– Erika Guevara Rosas, Americas Director of Amnesty International
The consequences that Guatemalan politicians drew from the findings of the CEH often remain unsatisfactory from the perspective of the victims of the civil war. The Guatemalan government has so far only complied to a limited extent with the Commission’s recommendation – which was all it could do within the scope of its mandate – to dismiss severely incriminated military personnel. It should be noted that the influence of the old elites in the military and administration remains unbroken and that official bodies, as the CEH staff have already realised, often resist enlightenment and change. The impunity of the now 91-year-old Efraín Ríos Montt, the man mainly responsible for the escalation of the civil war and the acts of systematic genocide in the early 1980s, is of particular and symbolic importance. As early as 2001, two years after the CEH presented its final report, its director Tomuschat declared that he saw the weakness of the judiciary, and above all the law enforcement authorities, as the main problem for the establishment of democratic structures in Guatemala .
On 12 December 2006, the United Nations and the government signed an agreement that provided for the establishment of an International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra La Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG). The agreement was ratified by the Guatemalan Congress in May 2007. CICIG was subsequently established as an independent international body to support prosecuting authorities, the national police and other state institutions in investigating crimes and human rights violations committed by illegal and clandestine paramilitary groups. Furthermore, according to the mandate, the commission is to support the Guatemalan government in disbanding such groups and in prosecuting them, and finally to make proposals for reforming the justice system. Finally, the commission is to provide advice on further institutional reforms to prevent the reorganisation of such groups, or at least make it more difficult.
In order to achieve these goals, the CICIG is authorised to act as a prosecutor in addition to the national authorities, to receive official complaints and to act as a third party in disciplinary proceedings against Guatemalan officials involved in crimes or obstructing criminal prosecution. It also advises law enforcement authorities on procedures and ensures confidentiality for witnesses who are willing to co-operate and provides protection from Guatemalan authorities. Originally given a mandate until 2009, this was extended twice by the UN at the request of the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provides advice on a number of legislative projects and reforms. These include measures against corruption, human trafficking, illegal adoption and proposals to improve international cooperation in the fight against crime. [42] With regard to the problem of impunity, the commission submitted legislative proposals concerning, among other things, habeas corpus provisions, witness protection, weapons legislation and the lifting of immunity. [43]
In addition to the initiation and monitoring of legislative projects, the support of the prosecution authorities in the investigation and criminal proceedings against actors in connection with war crimes stands out as an essential activity of the Commission.
The establishment of legal peace from the perspective of the victims, the legal reappraisal of crimes committed in a military conflict, in particular by representatives of a former state power, is a central element of the debate within society. Although numerous perpetrators have been brought to justice and convicted with the support of the CICIG, with witness evidence from the Truth Commission also being used as a basis, [44] impunity is still a problem 20 years after the end of the civil war. Despite institutional reforms to strengthen the judiciary and make the army accountable, the military still refuses to release documents that could shed light on killings, abductions, kidnappings, sexual offences and other war crimes [45] .
A number of high-ranking officials who bear responsibility for acts of genocide have not yet been convicted. First and foremost José Efraín Ríos Montt, responsible as president during the phase of the worst state excesses of violence, has so far gone unpunished. In 2013, Montt was sentenced to 80 years in prison for his responsibility for the systematic murder of the Ixil Indians and the displacement of tens of thousands during his presidency (1982-1983): 50 years for genocide and 30 years for crimes against humanity.[ 46] However, the fact that the judgement was not legally binding due to alleged procedural errors and the trial against the then 87-year-old was postponed had a devastating effect on the victims‘ sense of justice. [47] In 2015, the continuation of the trial was postponed again until January 2016, before which the now 90-year-old was granted immunity from prosecution due to his poor state of health. Although the criminal proceedings were continued behind closed doors in 2016, no further results have yet been achieved [48] .
The renewed postponement of the trial was seen by human rights organisations as a slap in the face to the victims, who were still trying to heal the wounds from the decades-long civil war. By allowing Rios Montt to evade justice for decades, the Guatemalan authorities have played a cruel game with the tens of thousands of victims and their relatives who were tortured, killed, abducted and forcibly displaced, according to Erika Guevara Rosas, Americas‘ Director at the International Secretariat of Amnesty International (AI) .
The ruling has also sparked criticism from other human rights organisations and legal experts. Ramón Cadena, Director of the International Commission of Jurists of Central America, stated: „This case shows the impunity that prevails in Guatemala and the obstacles that indigenous peoples face in demanding their rights and access to justice. In the vast majority of cases, it is impossible to bring the truth about criminal offences to light because powerful people are involved and the judges protect them.“
CICIG has therefore been able to initiate, support and promote a number of legislative initiatives, prosecution efforts and institutional restructuring measures, thus providing some impetus in the context of peace and nation-building. However, the instrument has reached the limits of its mandate in the face of political, institutional and social inertia and once again demonstrates the long-term nature of a comprehensive peace process.
Even 18 years after the end of the civil war in December 2014, dialogue cannot be taken for granted. For the first time, Julio Balconi, retired general and former defence minister, and Gustavo Meoño, former commander of the insurgent „Guerrilla Army of the Poor“ (EGP) and now director of the National Police Historical Archive, met at a panel discussion organised by the Deutsche Welle Academy and spoke about the massacres of the population [50] .
David Olmos, country manager for Guatemala at the Deutsche Welle Academy, spoke of a „cautious rapprochement“ in the hope that such a discussion platform could „initiate a national dialogue in the long term“. Olmos emphasised that „in Guatemala, there is still hardly any public discussion about the past“. In the media, „there is virtually no discussion of history, and the concerns of the indigenous population in particular are left out.“ [51]
The event was entitled „¿Tu verdad? No, la Verdad“ („Your truth? No, the truth“). It is thanks to the Truth Commission that there is a documented, undeniable truth. Guatemala now needs a functioning justice system that deals credibly with the crimes of over three decades of civil war and reaches judgements that allow the victims to see themselves as part of a society that takes their concerns seriously and allows them to experience a measure of justice. The penalties are secondary. This legal debate should be accompanied by a social discourse that has only begun very tentatively 18 years after the end of the war.
[ 1] GDP growth 4.1 per cent in 2015, 2.9 per cent in 2016, expected growth for 2017: 3.2 per cent; The World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview#1, last accessed on 7 May 2017; the above data on education ibid.
[ 2] Ibid.
[3] Thus Christian Tomuschat, „Die Arbeit der Wahrheitskommission in Guatemala“, in: Thilo Marauhn (ed.), Recht, Politik und Rechtspolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen . Tübingen 2005, pp. 27-44, here pp. 28ff.
[ 4] Tomuschat, „Truth Commission“, p. 29f.
[ 5] See the summary in: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juan-Jose-Arevalo, including further reading.
[ 6] Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the Sardines. First edition 1961: Whitefish 2007.
[ 7] Tomuschat, „Truth Commission“, p. 30f.
[ 8] Cf. https://www. britannica.com/biography/Jacobo-Arbenz, accessed on 25 June 2017.
[ 9] Cf. also Sabine Kurtenbach, „Ende gut alles gut? From War to Peace in Central America“, in: This, et al. (eds.), Central America. Politics, Economy, Culture Today. Frankfurt/M. 2008, p. 253-277, here p. 255f.
[ 10] On this in detail Villagrán Kramer, Biografia Politica de Guatemala. Guatemala City 1993, p. 379ff.
[ 11] Cf. Tomuschat, „Truth Commission“, p. 29.
[ 12] Ibid. p. 30.
[ 13] Ibid. p. 31.
[14] Cf. the figures in the final report of the CEH, Guatemala, Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification. Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 85. https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf (accessed on 06/06/2017)
[ 15] New York Times , 19 May 2013; https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/19/what-guilt-does-the-us-bear-in-guatemala/guatemalan-slaughter-was-part-of-reagans-hard-line, (accessed 11.06.) Although the State Department was aware of the massacres, Ronald Reagan still referred to Efrain Rios Montt as a „man of great integrity“ in 1982.
[ 16] Tomuschat, „Truth Commission“, p. 30.
[ 17] Cf. Marcie Mersky, „ Human Rights In Negotiating Peace Agreements: Guatemala. (PDF) “ In: The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Review Meeting. Peace Agreements: The Role of Human Rights in Negotiations , Belfast, 7-8 March 2005, p. 3 (retrieved 02.06.2017).
[18] Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Informe Final, Guatemala: Memoria de Silencio . Tomo IV, p. 138.
[ 19] Cf. Tomuschat, „Truth Commission“, p. 32f.
[ 20] The GAM (Grupo de apoyo mútuo), an association of women and widows for women’s and human rights, should also be mentioned here.
[ 21] Cf. the summary in Mersky, Human Rights , p. 4.
[22] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/368/21/PDF/N9636821.pdf?OpenElement.
[ 23] Cf. Mersky, Human Rights , p. 1f.
[24] „Acuerdo sobre el establecimiento de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico de las violaciones a los derechos humanos y los hechos de violencia que han causado sufrimientos a la población guatemalteco. English translation“, in: American Society of International Law (Ed.:), International Legal Materials , Vol. 36 (1997) No. 2, p. 283. See also the remarks of the Chairman of the Truth Commission: Christian Tomuschat, „Die Arbeit der Wahrheitskommission in Guatemala“, in: Thilo Marauhn (ed.), Recht, Politik und Rechtspolitik in den internationalen Beziehungen . Tübingen 2005, pp. 27-44, especially pp. 32ff. Cf. also Mersky, Human Rights , p. 3ff.
[ 25] Cf. the corresponding information in Tomuschat, ibid. p. 32.
[ 26] State-mandated truth commissions have so far been set up in Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru and Paraguay. Individual civil society and church initiatives should also be mentioned, as well as projects by state institutions, such as the initiative of the Honduran human rights procurator Leo Valladares, who initiated and carried out investigations to clarify the fate of disappeared persons, or the establishment of the „Special Prosecutor’s Office on Political and Social Movements of the Past“ by President Fox in Mexico (see Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal 2003). Cf. Pricilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths. Confronting State Terror and Atrocity . New York/London 2001.
[ 27] https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf.
[ 28] Result of the CEH investigation cited in Mersky, Human Rights , p. 3.
[ 29] On his work and function, see first his own account: Tomuschat, „ Wahrheitskommission „ ; the summarised findings of the Commission, Memoria de Silencio; Tomuschat is a member of the German Association for the United Nations (http://www.dgvn.de/ueber-uns/organisation/praesidium/ ), he was appointed head of the UNHCR mission in 2010 to implement the Goldstone Report, which had been prepared with regard to the Gaza war. Cf. Tovah Lazaroff, UN appoints Goldstone monitoring c’tee, Jerusalem Post online, 15.06.2010: http://www.jpost.com/International/UN-appoints-Goldstone-monitoring-ctee; he is a supporter of the Centre against Displacement (http://www.z-g-v.de/) .
[ 30] Cf. Tomuschat, „ Wahrheitskommission „, p. 34. A separate account: Edgar Alfredo Balsells Tojo, Olvido o memória. El Dilema De La Sociedád Guatemalteca . Guatemala City 2001, see also Amy Ross, „The creation and conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification“, in: Geoforum , Vol. 37 (2006), No. 1, pp. 69-81.
[ 31] In later years she was Minister of Culture and Sports and was a member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. (https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/) (accessed 21 June 2017); see also https://www.fundceri.org/jornada-alerta-democratica/ponentes/otilia-lux-de-coti (accessed 22 June 2017)
[ 32] Cf. the summary in Mersky, Human Rights , p. 4.
[ 33] Tomuschat, „Truth Commission“, p. 33ff.
[ 34] Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Informe Final, Guatemala:Memoria de Silencio, passim.
[35] Christian Tomuschat, „Failure or Success? Eine Bilanz der Arbeit der Wahrheitskommission in Guatemala“, in: Die Friedens-Warte , Vol. 74 (1999), H. 4, pp. 433-455, here p. 433.
[36] https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf (accessed 23 May 2017).
[37] https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf (24/05/2017).
[ 38] Cf. the interview with Christian Tomuschat from 2001: http://lateinamerika-nachrichten.de/?aaartikel=die-gesellschaft-hat-in-ihr-spiegelbild-geschaut.
[ 39] Frank La Rue, has pointed out the fundamental difference between the process of peace-making and the process of peace-building; a foundation of truth, clarification and documentation, created by an independent commission and once anchored in social discourse, can be fundamental to a peace and nation-building process, the implementation of which can of course no longer fall within the remit of a truth commission. Frank La Rue is Deputy Director-General for Communication and Information at UNESCO. He was previously UN Special Rapporteur on Development and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion. He has been an active human rights defender in his native Guatemala for over 25 years.
[ 41] Interview Tomuschat: http://lateinamerika-nachrichten.de/?aaartikel=die-gesellschaft-hat-in-ihr-spiegelbild-geschaut; a weakness of the judiciary in transition phases can often be observed, for example in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and in numerous African states; these judicial inadequacies justify Tomuschat’s call for a strengthening of international jurisdiction.
[42] http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=institutional-reform (accessed 22 May 2017).
[43] http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=institutional-reform (accessed 11 June 2017).
[ 44] A list of criminal proceedings with descriptions of the proceedings: http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2013/SENT-20131018-01-EN.pdf (accessed 14 June 2017).
[46] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/guatemala-court-ruling-on-rios-montt-s-case-highlights-flaws-in-justice-system/; see also: https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/indigenous-peoples/new-trial-for-rios-montt-could-include-info-on-us-role-in-his-regime/ (accessed 15 June 2017).
[ 47] „The special tribunal in charge of trying José Efraín Ríos Montt said today that the trial was being suspended due to procedural issues. [.. .]“. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/shameful-decision-to-postpone-rios-montt-trial-a-new-stain-on-guatemala-s-justice-system/ (accessed 15/06/2017).
[48 ]https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/indigenous-peoples/genocide-trial-for-guatemalan-president-in-2016-behind-closed-doors/ ; see also: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22605022 (accessed 15 June 2017).
[ 49] „By allowing Ríos Montt to evade the courts for decades, the Guatemalan authorities have been playing a cruel game with the victims of the tens of thousands of people who were tortured, killed, disappeared and forcibly displaced under his command and their relatives [.. .].“ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/shameful-decision-to-postpone-rios-montt-trial-a-new-stain-on-guatemala-s-justice-system/ (accessed 15 June 2017).
[ 50] Cf. the DW report at http://www.dw.com/de/guatemala-das-schweigen-brechen/a-18123768 (accessed 23 June 2016).
[ 51] Ibid.